Introduction
The process of globalisation has raised the fear among social scientists and the public that tax revenue of states and regulatory protection standards are driven down in a process of competition among states. Such a process might threaten the provision of national public goods from two sides (Sinn 1997) . First, tax revenues would go down and leave less room for public spending.
Second, regulatory competition would lead to lower regulatory levels of labour, health, environmental or product security standards leading to less protection for workers, consumers, and citizens.
Empirical evidence so far shows that capital tax competition works in fact as the theory predicts:
it drives tax rates down (Winner 2005; Ganghof 2006; Swank 2006; Franzese/Hays 2007; Genschel/Ganghof 2008) . The empirical picture for regulatory competition, however, is mixed. In the environmental field various approaches to measure regulatory competition have not lead to the one clear result, but rather to a complex empirical picture and to modifications of the theory.
There is no support for the hypothesis that regulatory competition necessarily leads to convergence 'at the bottom' (Berger and Dore 1996: vii; Drezner 2001: 75; Hoberg 2001b: 194; Bernauer and Caduff 2004: 100) , however, there are some indications, that regulatory competition might have an effect on the competitiveness of industries (Gray/Shadbegian 1993 Beers/Bergh 1999; Greenstone 2001; Xing/Kolstad 2002) . Moreover, there is case study evidence for 'races to the top' (Vogel 1997; Jänicke 1998; Kern 2000) .
Why do we, in contrast to the theory, not find a general race to the bottom? A whole number of hypotheses have been forwarded to explain the mixed evidence in the environmental field. Vogel (2000) and Jänicke (1998) have argued that environmental costs are not significant enough to cause regulatory competition. Jänicke and Jakob (2004) have pointed to the fact that political demand for strict environmental policies may outweigh economic pressures. Scharpf (1996 Scharpf ( , 1997 and Holzinger (2003) emphasize that context conditions, such as the trade regime, relative market size, or the type of standard, product or process, may account for the variance in empirical results.
In this article, a further hypothesis shall be explored. Given the existence of international cooperation and supra-national institutions in the environmental field, and in particular the European Union (EU), it might be profitable both for firms and for states not to engage in competition but instead to search for international harmonisation, i.e. 'to race to Brussels'. For business, harmonized environmental standards have the same effect as a cartel, potentially harmful competition is avoided. For governments exposed to voters' demand for high environmental quality, harmonisation serves to provide the public good at a higher level of governance. Moreover, in the case of transboundary environmental problems, providing the good at a supra-national level is more adequate. Finally, if voters or industry judge the harmonized standard as too strict or too lax, governments can shift responsibility to the supra-national institution. With international harmonisation they incur a lesser risk of loosing voter or industry support.
It is the aim of this article to develop this hypothesis and to provide empirical support for it. Our data set includes information on the development of 17 environmental policies in 24, mostly
European, countries over a period from 1970 to 2005. We use this data first to show whether there was in fact a 'race to the top' or 'to the bottom' of environmental regulation in this period, and second to provide indications of an active search for European environmental harmonisation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theory of regulatory competition in the environmental field and some modifications. Section 3 gives a brief account of the empirical evidence so far. Section 4 presents the findings from our own data with respect to basic and modified hypotheses of regulatory competition theory. Section 5 develops the 'race to Brussels' hypothesis and provides some evidence for it.
The Theory of Regulatory Competition in the Field of the Environment
The concept of regulatory competition is based on economic theories of systems competition and regulatory competition (Tiebout 1956; Oates/Schwab 1988; Long/Siebert 1991; Sinn 1997) . It was first used to explain the American experience with corporate chartering. The model rapidly flourished because it provides an explanation of how regulators respond to the demands of mobile factors (Barbou des Places 2004: 75) . While the economic literature focuses on normative questions, such as the effects on efficiency or democracy, political science literature has concentrated on the question whether regulatory competition actually works and whether it induces races to the top or to the bottom.
The theory of environmental competition
The basic theory of environmental regulatory competition suggests that the presence of competition leads to a race to the bottom of environmental standards. This thesis is based on the assumption that the increasing integration of European and global markets, the abolition of national trade barriers, the international mobility of goods, workers and capital pressures nation states to redesign domestic market regulations in order to avoid regulatory burdens restricting the competitiveness of domestic industries (Goodman/Pauly 1993; Keohane/Nye 2000; Holzinger/Knill 2004: 27f ).
At the micro-level, causality is assumed to work through three mechanisms: First, the presence of mobile capital can induce governments to attract capital from elsewhere by lowering environmental standards. Second, domestic capital can exit, because strict environmental standards impose high costs on polluters in high-income economies. To remain competitive, these firms relocate to low-income countries. Rising capital outflow forces governments in high-income countries to lower the level of regulation (Wheeler 2000: 2) . Third, industry may lobby governments to introduce laxer regulation, using the threat of exit. This way, regulatory competition among governments may lead to a 'race to the bottom' in environmental policy, implying policy convergence at a low level of regulation ( Drezner 2001: 57-59; Hoberg 2001a: 127; Simmons/Elkins 2003) .
Modifications of the theory
The theory rests on a number of implicit assumptions. Most importantly, it is assumed that the costs of stricter environmental standards are high enough to cause severe competitive disadvantages to firms exposed to these standards and to lead firms to change their investment locations.
Second, the model is based on the idea of competition among firms within a common market or a free trade regime. Third, the theory does not differentiate between product standards and process standards. Fourth, it is assumed that governments react exclusively to the preferences of international capital, ignoring the preferences of voters or interest groups (Jänicke/Jacob 2004: 32) .
Fifth, Chua (1999: 423) concludes in her study that the ambiguity of empirical results arises partly from the role of innovation and the international diffusion of environmental technologies, and the positive economic feedback effects of a cleaner environment. Finally, the result of regulatory competition depends on contextual factors, such as relative market size or number of competing countries (Oates 1998; Apolte 2002; Holzinger 2003) .
These observations lead to some modifications of the theory. Vogel (2000: 365f; cf. Revesz 1992) stresses that for all but a handful of industries, the costs of compliance with stricter regulatory standards have not been sufficiently high to force relatively affluent nations to choose between competitiveness and environmental protection. In marked contrast to labour costs, the overall costs of compliance with environmental regulations have to date been modest. The national levels of pollution control expenditures have had little effect on economic growth (cf. Vogel 1997; Jänicke 1998; Jänicke/Jacob 2004: 33) . Vogel (2000: 267) argues that environmental standards are primarily determined by domestic political preferences and interests. They tend to be stronger and better enforced in affluent nations with influential green pressure groups. They also tend to be strengthened during periods of economic prosperity and stabilized or weakened during periods of slower growth.
Moreover, in reality it is often permitted to wall off a country against foreign products on the basis of health and environmental reasons. In this case, competitive disadvantages of an industry in a high standard country might not be very serious. Holzinger (2003: 206-207) shows that the result of regulatory competition -a 'race to the top', 'to the bottom', or to neither one-varies with several factors; in particular with the type of trade regime (barriers to trade permitted or mutual recognition), the heterogeneity of actors preferences, relative size of market shares and the exact object of the regulation -namely products or production processes. Under recognition of these factors no general 'race to the bottom' can be predicted. Apolte (2002: 389f) argues that a 'race to the bottom' does not necessarily need to follow from competition. If not a large number of small jurisdictions but a small number of large jurisdictions compete for quality standards, then the resulting quality standards will end up above the minimum level.
The distinction between product and production process standards is of particular relevance.
Whereas for product standards, several factors might inhibit a 'race to the bottom' and even trigger a 'race to the top', a widely shared expectation in the literature is that policy convergence will occur at the lowest common denominator in the case of process standards (Scharpf 1996 (Scharpf , 1997 Drezner 2001; Holzinger 2002 Holzinger , 2003 . Industries in both low-regulating and high-regulating countries have a common interest in harmonizing product standards to avoid market segmentation. Whether harmonisation occurs at the level of high-regulating or low-regulating countries depends on a number of additional factors, most importantly the extent to which high-regulating countries are able to factually enforce stricter standards. If it is possible to erect exceptional trade barriers (e.g. for health or environmental reasons under EU and WTO rules) convergence at a high level of regulation is likely (Vogel 1995; Scharpf 1997: 523) . If such exceptional trade bar-riers are not permitted, by contrast, competitive pressure is expected to induce governments to lower their environmental standards (Holzinger 2003: 192) .
The classical example of a 'race to the top' with product standards relates to car emissions. When
California raised its emission standards, most US states followed quickly (Vogel 1995 Given environmental costs are significant, the differentiations of the theory lead to the following modified hypotheses on environmental regulatory competition: 
Empirical Studies
This section gives a brief overview of empirical studies on environmental competition. We refer firstly to studies that present evidence seemingly confirming the predicted 'race to the bottom', and secondly to studies that do not confirm 'races to the bottom' or even find 'races to the top'.
Evidence for competition in laxity
There are a few studies confirming some of the basic assumptions of the theory, for example, that strict environmental regulation leads to high compliance costs which leads in turn to reduced growth in productivity, job losses, reduced competitiveness, and to decisions to relocate into less regulated jurisdictions (cf. Jenkins 1998: 3). There are studies which find evidence at the firm level that more stringent pollution regulation deters new firms entry into pollution-intensive sectors (Becker/Henderson 1997 List/Co 2000) . Shadbegian (1993, 1997) show a negative relationship between environmental compliance costs and the level and productivity growth for the pulp and paper, oil refining and steel industries. Greenstone (2001) finds that in the first 15 years after the Clean Air Act Amendments became law in the US (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) , nonattainment counties lost jobs, capital stock, and output in pollution intensive industries (in comparison to attainment counties).
Competitiveness of an industry is usually related to performance in international trade. Robison (1988) suggests a relative loss of competitiveness in more polluting industries on the basis of his finding that the average pollution-intensity of US imports increased relative to its exports between the early 1970s and the early 1980s. Sorsa (1994: 29f) shows that Japan is the clearest 
Evidence for competition in stringency
A number of studies relying on the same indirect economic indicators find no 'races to the bottom'. List et al. (2003) examine the location decisions of domestic and foreign firms. They find that domestic firms are influenced by environmental regulation, whereas foreign firms are not.
This implies that countries can introduce more stringent environmental regulations without risking the loss of substantial foreign capital. Levinsion (1996) could not find a systematic effect between interstate differences in environmental regulation and location choices of manufacturing plants. Unlike previous work in this area, this study explores the relationship between site choice and environmental regulations using a broad range of industries and measures of stringency.
Another group of studies uses data on the development of environmental quality to evaluate whether there have been any 'races'. Most of this work finds 'races to the top'. The results of In sum, there is some evidence for a negative effect of stringent environmental regulation on economic factors, such as productivity growth and other indicators of competitiveness, as well as capital relocation as a result of environmental costs. The evidence is not particularly strong, however, as there are other studies showing that capital relocation is not caused by environmental regulation. Moreover, studies analysing the change in environmental quality find no 'races to the bottom', but 'races to the top' instead.
None of the studies reviewed above, measure 'regulatory races' directly. They use economic indicators which show a relationship between environmental costs and competitiveness or location decisions, or they use environmental indicators which measure the development of the quality of the environment. The first approach relates only to the 'independents' in the causal chain of the theory (environmental regulation costs -capital relocation) and does not show that there is actually a regulatory race at the 'dependent' side (relaxation of environmental regulation in many countries). The second approach includes the 'dependent' variables in a very indirect way: environmental outcome data is affected by many intermediate variables, such as bad implementation of the law or an increase or decrease of pollution activities. The theory of regulatory competition, however, is a micro-theory, that focuses on governmental behaviour. It is the regulatory output,
i.e., the laws and decrees that will be changed by governments as a result of the causal mechanism. Therefore, environmental output data is the best indicator for the dependent variable. So far, there are no encompassing studies using output data for the test of environmental regulatory competition.
No 'Race to the Bottom' in Europe
In this section we present data on the development of environmental regulation in 24 countries over a period of 35 years. After a brief description of the database we present findings on upward and downward 'moves' for 17 prominent environmental regulations. Finally, we introduce a simple statistical model to explain the changes in regulations.
Database
In the project "Environmental Governance 
Continuous improvement in the level of protection
We first address the question how environmental policy change at the national level occurs: Are there in fact 'races to the bottom' or do we rather find evidence for a tightening of environmental standards? The sample includes member states of the old EU-15 (excluding Luxembourg), plus Switzerland, Norway, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, the United States, Mexico, and Japan. This includes the cases of newly introduced norms, as the shift from no standard to the setting of a standard (no matter on which level) must be considered an improvement of environmental policies. value. This nominal change cannot be interpreted as a 'race to the bottom'.
For zinc emissions in industrial discharges the downward development can to a large degree be explained by Mexico and changes in Eastern European countries which for the first time introduced 'realistic' standards during the 1990s. Most Eastern European countries had -for reputational reasons -extremely strict legal standards for some environmental media, but did not implement them. The story is similar for BOD and the other industrial emissions. Figure 1 shows how downward moves are distributed over the countries in the sample. Only for the US and Japan no downward changes are reported, whereas most European countries experience at least one instance. This is due to the above described technical change of measuring procedures for car emission standards. Higher numbers of downward changes are only found in Mexico and Eastern European countries for the reasons given above. The only Western country with more than two downward changes is Germany; here some ambitious recycling quotas have been relaxed later on.
Explanation of regulatory changes
The descriptive analysis does not tell us, however, why we find such an overwhelming increase in regulatory stringency and such a large number of upward moves. The hypotheses from table 1 have been confirmed only partially, and two questions are raised by the descriptive analysis of our data: Is the 'race to the top' for product standards a consequence of regulatory competition or of other factors? The upward movement in the case of process standards is surely not the result of competition -what is it then? Therefore we proceed to an explanation of the observed changes in regulation.
The descriptive analysis of downward changes showed that these are obviously not the result of competitive pressures. The relative number of downward movements is low (6%) and linked to two singular events. Thus, a systematic causal analysis of regulatory downward changes is not promising.
The theory rests on two assumptions which are briefly discussed before we turn to a regression model. First, a perfect free trade regime with regard to environmental standards does not exist. In the EU and the World Trade Organisation trade barriers can be justified with reference to the protection of health and the environment in many cases (Epiney 2000) . Countries with high levels of protection will therefore be able to retain those standards against competition from countries with lower standards. Thus, only the upper cells of table 1 are relevant in practice.
Second, there is already a whole lot of international cooperation for the protection of transnational environmental goods. On the one hand there is a large number of specific environmental regimes safeguarded by international law. On the other hand there are many binding rules set up by the EU by which national norms are being harmonised. Nation states no longer act in an anarchic international system with independent mutual recognition. Through international cooperation, minimum harmonisation levels are set against 'races to the bottom' and in the (rare) case of total harmonisation there is even complete convergence of national norms. Whenever there are binding international rules we will thus not expect regulatory competition to work.
On the basis of our descriptive data we cannot tell whether the upward movement is due to international harmonisation or whether regulatory competition is at least partly responsible (for 'races to the top' in the case of product standards). All product standards in the data set are harmonised in Europe. This counts also for some process standards but not for industrial discharges. Therefore, in the next step we will try to explain the observed pattern of upward change. For control we test some other variables that may lead to changes in national environmental policies. For example, the level of economic development (income per capita) and political mobilisation may bring forth more strict environmental policies. The latter is measured by the presence of an environmental ministry, the presence of a Greenpeace national Bureau, and the role and influence of Green parties in a country. Energy use per capita is taken as a general proxy for the salience of environmental problems which should be a precondition for the introduction of regulations. Finally, as an indicator for domestic political constraints to policy change we use the number of veto players in a country.
We test the influence of these potential explanatory variables on upward movements for all 17 environmental standards and for the subgroups of product and process standards. In addition, regressions have been run separately for the period before 1990 and after 1990, when harmonisation increased at the international level and the far-reaching transformations in Eastern European countries took place. With the aggregation across 17 standards, dichotomous data on policy change is transformed to count data. With mean values lower than the standard deviation for all types of the dependent variable, we applied a negative binomial regression model with random effects. We compare the effects of the first three variables representing effects of economic competition with models that include the whole set of control variables. can explain the upward trend at least for product standards -as predicted from theory. These effects seem to be higher before 1990. However, the coefficient gets insignificant when control variables enter the model.
Although there is some confirmation for the hypothesis that competition is responsible for upward shifts in environmental product standards, the upward trend in environmental policy can also be traced back to the influence of variables other than competition, as the more encompassing models show. As expected, harmonisation plays an important role. The models reveal a positive and strongly significant effect of EU-membership, except for process standards. Positive effects of the accession to international institutions can be found for the overall model and in particular for the period after 1990 as well as for process standards (note that most of our process standards are not regulated by the EU).
Turning to the explanatory relevance of the control variables, our findings show that some variables seem to contribute to the explanation of the upward move, at least for some subgroups of the dependent variable. This holds for the existence of a national Greenpeace office as one measure of the environmental movement and for energy use per capita as a proxy for problem pressure. No significant effects have been found for the presence of environmental ministries and the success of green parties, and for the level of income (the negative effect in some of the models is a consequence of the process of catching up of latecomer countries in the second half of the observation period). Finally, coefficients of the political constraint variable show the expected negative sign. The lower the number of veto players, the higher is the probability of upward shifts in environmental regulation. Table 3 Regressions of Upward Movements in 17 Environmental Standards, 1970-20 
'Race to Brussels' instead
Two main conclusions can be derived from our empirical analysis. First, there are no 'races to the bottom' but evidence of a far-reaching upward trend in environmental regulation from the 1970s until today. Second, the main driving forces behind this pattern are EU-harmonisation and international cooperation. However, in the case of product standards regulatory trade barriers seem to also exert some influence.
It would thus be premature to conclude that regulatory competition has no influence at all. The predominant number of the policies analysed here is already subject to European harmonisation; a 'race to the bottom' is thus no longer possible. The question remains, why there is so much international harmonisation with product and process standards. In the following we first elaborate on potential motives for a 'race to Brussels' and then take another look at our data to find out about indications of avoidance of competition through international harmonisation
Incentives for international cooperation and EU harmonisation
There are many incentives for business and other political actors to cooperate at the international level. In some cases there are also incentives for cooperation on a high level of protection. First, in the case of transnational environmental goods there are environmentally justified incentives for international cooperation: due to externalities between the states those problems can only be efficiently solved together. Externalities furthermore lead to distributional effects that create incentives for international cooperation. Second, the advantages of harmonisation of product standards (cf. Finally, there are also 'innovative races' (Jänicke 2005) . Countries that are forerunners with respect to environmental legislation frequently want to make their rules obligatory at the international level.
Those countries often have highly developed environmental industries that are able to offer innovative technology first. International harmonisation at the level of the best available technology gives those industries competitive advantages. In addition, a pioneer country avoids adoption costs if its model of regulation becomes obligatory internationally. Environmental front-runner countries will normally plead for regulations on a high level of protection in international negotiations. Table 4 gives an overview of the motives, the policy types, and the actors interested. It can be seen, that incentives for supranational harmonisation are biggest in the case of product standards. There are also substantial incentives for the harmonisation of process norms. For trade-irrelevant policies, incentives are lowest. As a matter of fact, all six product standards analysed here are harmonised, while this goes only for three out of eight process standards and for one out of three trade-irrelevant policies. The motivation for strict norms is biggest in the case of product standards, followed by process standards and trade-irrelevant policies. This corresponds with the data on upward movements in table 2. 
Cooperation as prevention of competition?
Finally, we take another look at our data to analyse whether environmental policies are harmonised in order to prevent regulatory competition. We restrict our analysis to those six of our policies that have been harmonised in the EU after 1970. As the number of cases is too low to get any significant result in a statistical model, we descriptively display the competitive situation in the years before the introduction of an EU directive. Table 5 shows what happened for each policy 1, 3, and 5 years before a mandatory regulation at the EU level was adopted. As decision-making processes in the EU take up to five years, looking at this period of time seems justified. The first rows indicate whether a regulation in this area was present in some important non-EU states which are economically significant and/or environmental pioneers:
Japan, the US and Sweden. Further down the data is given for the most important EU member states whose policies can be expected to have an effect on others as a consequence of market size or as a political signal. The following rows give the overall number of countries and the number and share of EU members in our sample which already had adopted a regulation in this period. Finally, it is shown whether the regulatory mean in the respective years shifted upward or downward and whether the mean level of regulation was stricter or laxer among EU members compared to the whole group of countries having a regulation. First of all, in most cases there were in fact regulations present in two important non-EU members before the EU rule was introduced. Second, in most cases there was at least one big EU member state which had a regulation in place. Both observations are prerequisites for the presumed threat of regulatory competition. A notable exception are NO x emissions from cars for which only the US and Sweden had a standard before the EU adopted one. With this exception, the number of adopters of national regulations obviously increases before the EU acts. There is definitely a diffusion process starting before the EU joins in and harmonizes the regulation for its member states. Regulatory competition is imminent.
Furthermore, we see a movement towards a higher regulatory level, as in most instances the mean level of regulation has been strengthened in the respective years (again, with the exception of NO x , as only two countries have just introduced a standard). The mean of the regulations of EU members is more stringent as the mean of all countries having adopted a regulation in about half of the cases.
There is no clear pattern here that could tell us whether the EU harmonizes in order to enlarge the bloc of states using more stringent regulations and thus avoid potential competition for the pioneers.
As the mean changes upward the 'contagious' effect might also be a consequence of the environmental pioneers' interest to 'upload' their regulations on the EU.
It is in general difficult to see from our data which of the discussed motives for EU harmonisation is in fact responsible for international cooperation. For all six standards pollution is potentially transboundary. The case is most severe for NO x and SO 2 emissions, whether from cars or from power plants. Lead and Dust are not wide range air pollutants. The standards for gas oil, petrol and cars possess a harmonisation advantage, whereas this is not the case for large combustion plants. Harmonisation avoids barriers to trade for the car emission standards and to a lesser degree for gas oil and petrol limit values. As these products are manufactured by a small number of companies which trade worldwide, we can assume that these companies expressed their interest in harmonisation to several governments. A competitive advantage in environmental technology can be assumed to have been present for some pioneer countries, for example for car producers in Germany. In sum, for most standards several motives apply, most notably for NO x emissions from cars. This corresponds with the data given in table 5 showing that NO x harmonisation happened most quickly and without much preceding national regulation.
We cannot conclude, therefore, that the motive to avoid harmful competition within the European common market and among EU member states has been the only driving force for European harmonisation. Sorting out the role and contribution of the various motives for international cooperation can probably best be done by profound case study research on the introduction of these regulations.
The motives of governments and economic actors can be reconstructed (at least to a certain extent) on the basis of document analysis or interviews.
One case in point is passenger car regulation. Car emissions have been harmonised on a voluntary basis from 1950 onward through the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE). The car industry actively participates in the setting of voluntary rules and harmonisation advantages play a great role. Car emissions provide also an example for prevention of competition through harmonisation. The introduction of the catalyst car during the 1980s started with a big German car company proposing to the German minister for environmental affairs to make catalysts the norm. The precondition should, however, be the introduction of catalysts at an EU-wide level by means of a European directive. Obviously, this firm wanted to exploit a perceived competitive advantage in technology, but also wanted to avoid fierce competition in case of the introduction of a national German standard (Holzinger 1994: 199ff.) . This is anecdotal evidence that cannot be generalized. It is an indication, however, that the active search for international harmonisation in order to avoid regulatory competition by industry and governments is not uncommon. This implies that the threat of a regulatory competition would become effective through the back-door -by preventing competition using the means of international cooperation.
Conclusion
A review of the literature on regulatory competition in the environmental field shows that the basic prediction of a 'race to the bottom' of the regulatory level has meanwhile been changed into more differentiated hypotheses. Empirical evidence is mixed, with some evidence for the presence of competitive pressures on countries introducing strict environmental regulations, but more evidence for the non-existence of a general 'race to the bottom'. So far, empirical tests did not use data on the change in environmental regulations itself but used economic indicators or environmental quality data instead.
In this paper we analysed the development of 17 environmental regulations in 24 countries over a period of 35 years. These data show not only the absence of a 'race to the bottom', but a clear 'race to the top'. Ninety-four per cent of all changes in regulations are upward moves with only 6 per cent downward moves. A downwards competition can therefore be ruled out already on the basis of the descriptive data.
The regression analysis shows that the upward moves of product standards can be partially connected to the extent of trade barriers. However, the explanatory models display clearly that the overwhelming upward move of environmental regulation is mostly driven by supranational cooperation at EU level and the integration of countries into international environmental regimes.
For the policies under scrutiny here, it is basically EU harmonisation that can explain the upward movement. EU harmonisation may however be motivated by imminent regulatory competition. The data shows that EU regulation of a certain environmental problem seems to be preceded by national regulations in important EU and non-EU economies and/or environmental pioneer states. Usually, before the EU adopts a directive, a diffusion process has started and we observe the onset of a 'race to the top'.
On the basis of our data we cannot rule out other motivations for international harmonisation of environmental standards than the avoidance of competition. Candidates are the transboundary nature of the problem, economic harmonisation advantages in case of product standards, the abolition of trade barriers, and a desire to 'upload' their regulation to the supranational level on the side of pioneer countries. These are many good reasons 'to race to Brussels' and seek for international harmonisation of environmental regulation.
